

The Early Heidegger and the Givenness of Form

(Chapter 2 of Draft MS: *The Logic of Being: Heidegger, Truth, and Time*)

Between 1919 and 1926, Heidegger developed many of the aspects of the particular methodology that is applied the “preliminary” ontological analysis of Dasein and the analysis of Dasein’s relationship to time that comprise the finished and published portion of *Being and Time*. Over these years, Heidegger’s development of phenomenological methods and his increasingly deep critique of Husserl lead him to formulate the project of ontology as a “hermeneutics of facticity” and to a new understanding of the possibility of reflective access to the *a priori* and thereby to the underlying ontological character of beings. In this development, Heidegger retains important elements of Husserl’s anti-psychologism while questioning, in increasingly radical terms, the *temporal* status of the ideality of content which Husserl presupposes, as well as the subjectivist understanding of consciousness that underlies Husserl’s transcendental idealism. His pursuit of this problem, I argue here, as developing a problematic that he shares with Plato and other historical philosophers, that of the *givenness* of form or of the formal dimension of concretely experienced life. This questioning leads Heidegger ultimately to conceive of the ontological basis for the temporality presupposed throughout the metaphysical tradition as resting in a more basic formally indicated structure of Dasein as original temporality, to be understood as a self-givenness of time that reflexively produces the temporality of the world from a position within it.

The methodological devices Heidegger developed over these years have a twofold significance for the current problematic of truth and time. First, they show how a genuinely *hermeneutic* methodology can illuminate formal and ontologically constitutive structures of both phenomena, clarifying their sense and their relationship to the sense of being by indicating the form of their givenness in factual life. Especially important in demonstrating the possibility of this clarification is, as we shall see, the methodology of *formal indication*, which points to and articulates the formal underlying structure what is in each case given, in its concreteness, in the singularity of a concrete life. Second, they show how a hermeneutics of facticity in this sense can itself re-open what is for Heidegger the decisive question of the structure of given time: that is, of time as experienced and measured by an entity, Dasein, which stands in a particular and definitive structural relationship to its world. The upshot of both of these is, as we shall see, to point toward the possibility of a phenomenologically and ontologically clarified understanding of the relationship of sense, truth and given time as grounded in an original structure of reflexivity, beyond or before what Heidegger suggests is the metaphysical determination of the temporal meaning of being in general in terms of the priority of the present “now”.

I.

In a 1963 retrospective essay devoted to tracing his own “way to phenomenology,” Heidegger recalls one of the particular issues in Husserl’s phenomenology that, as he studied with Husserl in the early 1920s, yielded a special directive for Heidegger’s own developing sense of the application of phenomenological methods to the problem of being:

As I myself practiced phenomenological seeing, teaching, and learning in Husserl's proximity after 1919 and at the same time tried out a transformed understanding of Aristotle in a seminar, my interest leaned anew toward the *Logical Investigations*, above all the sixth investigation in the first edition. The distinction which is worked out there between sensuous and categorial intuition revealed itself to me in its scope for the determination of the "manifold meaning of being" [*"mannigfachen Bedeutung des Seienden"*].¹

Over the course of the 1920s, Heidegger would come to doubt many aspects of Husserl's phenomenological project: its basis in what was, for Heidegger, the unexamined privilege of the conscious subject, its prioritization of theoretical understanding over the concrete life in which all theory is rooted, its basic (and, for Heidegger, ungrounded) distinction between the domains of the real, factual accomplishment of intentional acts and the ideal realm of their content or sense.

But in the 1963 retrospective, Heidegger also alludes positively to an essential connection between Husserl's theory of categorial intuition and his own phenomenological understanding of the disclosure of beings in truth. What, then, is categorial intuition, and how did the young Heidegger come to understand its implications as an essential phenomenological method, even beyond its application within what he came to see as the narrow confines of Husserl's phenomenology? Most directly, Husserl's theory of categorial intuition arises in response to questions internal to his own phenomenological account of truth and knowledge. On this account, knowledge consists in a particular kind of "identifying" synthesis between an intentional act that intends an object or state of affairs and a distinct act of intuition or presentation that "fulfills" this intention. For instance, in a simple perceptual act, an object of perception may be intended in an unfulfilled way as I take myself to see it; if the object indeed exists and presents itself, the act is fulfilled and knowledge is attained. Husserl understands this as an "identifying act" that connects the meaning-intention with the actual presence of the object as it is in itself and is directly given.²

Indeed, Husserl suggests in the introduction to the sixth *Logical Investigation*, it is in terms of such an "synthesis of fulfillment" that we must understand the phenomenological idea of "being in the sense of truth"; here we have, Husserl says, the "single...phenomenological situation" upon which all of the "varying notions of truth" must be based. The complete fulfillment that occurs in the "identifying synthesis," moreover, is, Husserl says, "'correspondence' rightly understood, *the adaequatio rei ac intellectus*."³ Here we have, in other words, a complete and final correspondence of the intellect with the givenness of the object as it is in itself. It is this conception of the universal structure of truth that leads Husserl, in connection with the complexities of the various kinds of intentional acts, to introduce the concept of "categorial" as distinct from merely "sensuous" intuition. In a simple act of perceiving an object, knowledge can be understood as the correspondence of an intending act with a purely sensory fulfillment that presents that individual object in its direct appearance. Here, for instance, I perceive a

¹ "Mein Weg in die Phänomenologie", GA 14, p. 98.

² Husserl (1900/01), pp. 589-92, p. 594.

³ Husserl (1900/01), p. 477. This is Husserl's phenomenological formulation of what Heidegger repeatedly cites, in the Latin, as the motto of the traditional "correspondence" theory of truth.

red surface; the sensory quality of redness is given directly and simply in the fulfilling intuition. But it is very often the case, (as, for instance, in the acts underlying even simple predicative judgments and assertions) that what we have knowledge of has, essentially, a form and structure that goes beyond simple, individual perceptual presentations I may have, for instance, a perceptual experience that yields not only the simple seeing of an individual object, but also of *how things stand* with the presented object (or objects) as well:

In the case of a perceptual statement, not only the inwrought [*eingeflochtenen*] nominal presentations are fulfilled: the whole sense of the statement [*Aussagebedeutung*] finds fulfillment through our underlying percept. [For instance]...we do not merely say 'I see this paper, an inkpot, several books', and so on, but also 'I see that the paper has been written on, that there is a bronze inkpot standing here, that several books are lying open', and so on.⁴

This possibility, that complex and structured states of affairs as well as simple objects can be given intuitively, essentially complicates the phenomenological account of truth as "identifying synthesis." Accordingly, we must pose, as Husserl now does, the question of "What may and can furnish fulfillment for those aspects of meaning which make up propositional form as such, the aspects of '*categorial form*' to which, e.g., the copula belongs?"⁵ Since, Husserl says, there is nothing in the sensory givenness of the objects to correspond with such elements of the complex judgment as are expressed by words such as "'the', 'a', 'some,' 'many' 'few,' 'two,' 'is', 'not', 'which', 'and,' 'or,' etc.,"⁶ we must recognize, in addition to sensuous intuitions, the possibility of a distinct kind of wholly non-sensuous intuition which yields knowledge of the possible forms of objects and their combination and relation, including the sense of "being" as expressed in the copula of a predicative assertion such as "the paper is white".

More generally, Husserl says, all talk of "logical form" must be understood in terms of the kind of structure that is added by categorial intuition to the simple "material" of objects presented.⁷ In any case of complex, structured presentation, there will be aspects of what is presented that go beyond the simple, sensory material itself. In each such case, Husserl argues, it is therefore necessary to acknowledge the givenness of structure or form that goes beyond mere sensory intuition, yielding possible knowledge of the properties, aspects, and relations (logical as well as empirical) of the things as they are in themselves. Indeed, according to Husserl, it is in categorial intuition that *universals* and types are first given to us as objects of knowledge. In particular, on the basis of several acts of intuition of individuals, it is possible that a new kind of "abstractive" act occurs in which an object of a new type is given – the universal under which each of the several particulars stands.⁸ Although this new objectivity remains abstractively *founded* on wholly sensory presentations, it also goes beyond the individual

⁴ Husserl (1900/01), p. 600.

⁵ Husserl (1900/01), p. 601.

⁶ Husserl (1900/01), p. 601.

⁷ Husserl (1900/01), p. 478.

⁸ Husserl (1900/01), p. 634.

sensory presentations in yielding intuitive access to an “ideal object”, the “very sort” [*diese Art selbst*] shared by them.⁹

In his *Formal and Transcendental Logic* of 1929, Husserl further clarifies the phenomenologically crucial dimension of the logical givenness of form as supported by the possibility of categorial intuition. Here, in characterizing the totality of a phenomenological logic devoted, as a whole, to the structure of judgments, Husserl distinguishes between the levels of a “formal logic” devoted only to the possible forms of judgments and a “transcendental” logic that goes beyond this to characterize the evidential and other aspects of judgments by virtue of which they become candidates for possible truth. According to Husserl, the study of the possible relations of judgments in accordance with fundamental laws of validity, and most importantly the law of non-contradiction, yields a “pure analytic apophantics” or a general theory of the possible forms of judgment and possibilities for their conjunction in the unity of a statement or theory.¹⁰ Significantly, Husserl sees this “analytic apophantics” also as yielding general categorial structures such as that of the state of affairs, the object, and other general categorial determinations, as well as unity, plurality, and more complex mathematical structures.¹¹ As such, this analytic apophantics is capable of underlying a general and comprehensive formal-mathematical ontology that functions as an a priori formal theory of the possible structures of all objects and objectivities.¹²

This is to be supplemented with a “transcendental logic” that, going beyond the mere constraint of the law of non-contradiction, yields a synthetic theory of the givenness of material-apriori provinces “in one totality”, i.e. the totality and unity of “world”.¹³ This involves extending the formal-analytic investigations of formal apophantics and ontology into the consideration of various material regions and the different kinds and degrees of *evidence* involved in the acquisition of knowledge in each of these domains. In accordance with the later Husserl’s “genetic” phenomenology, the domain of transcendental logic is seen, along with the unity of the world that it articulates, as constituted by a transcendental subjectivity that gives unity and normativity to all possible empirical theories of the world. Nevertheless, this “transcendental” logic remains rigorously grounded in the first, purely analytic and apophantic level of logic, and in a certain sense both actually remain “formally” determined. In particular, both levels of logical theory remain wholly dependent on non-sensory, categorial intuition of form to specify their relative articulations of the specific formal and material ontological domains that they yield. In both cases, what remains essential is the possible givenness of *ideal* structures and objects, in which, according to Husserl, a consciousness is formed of the ideal judgment, argument, etc. as “not merely quite alike or similar” in their various empirical instances, but rather “numerically, identically, the same”.¹⁴ Thus, although the instances of the “appearance of the judgment” in

⁹ Husserl thus does not yet distinguish categorial intuition here from what he will later call “eidetic” intuition or the showing of essences; for the latter, see, e.g., Husserl (1913) and Husserl (1939).

¹⁰ Husserl (1929), pp. 47-48; pp. 57-58.

¹¹ Husserl (1929), pp. 77-78.

¹² Husserl (1929), p. 68.

¹³ Husserl (1929), p. 134.

¹⁴ Husserl (1929), p. 138.

consciousness may be multiple, it is possible to attain an intuitive awareness of the judgment itself as an objectivity outside of temporal determination and identically the same in each of its appearances.¹⁵

Husserl's argument in the first three sections of Part II of *Formal and Transcendental Logic* repeats extends the devastating critique of psychologism that he already undertook in the "Prolegomena to pure logic" at the beginning of the *Logical Investigations*.¹⁶ Whereas the psychological occurrences of thoughts and judgments, and their expressions in language, appear multiply and at discrete temporal moments, it is possible to obtain an awareness and evidence of them as single, identical objects not determined as existing at any particular point or span in time. This is, according to Husserl, an original form of presentation of the judgment as such, a presentation capable of underlying its multiple appearance at discrete times and in various instances, but itself giving its object as outside time and independent of temporal determination. The judgment as given in this way, on the abstractive basis of sensory intuition but essentially through categorial intuition, is an "irreal" ideality which, though like all "irrealities" capable of participating, in its own way, in temporally determined states of affairs and situations but nevertheless independent of time in itself.¹⁷

II

From the beginning of his academic career, Heidegger's own investigations of contemporary thinkers and the historical tradition show a deep concern with the question of the source and provenance of categories in relation to the psychology of the thinking subject. In the first, doctoral qualifying dissertation of 1913, *The Doctrine of Judgment in Psychologism*, Heidegger applies Husserl's critique of psychologism about the basis of judgment to the theories of Wilhelm Wundt, Theodor Lipps, Heinrich Meier, and Franz Brentano. Two years later, the *Habilitationsschrift*, titled "The theory of the categories and meaning in Duns Scotus," had exhaustively examined the problem of the origin of categories in Scotus' scholastic philosophy, with particular emphasis on the origination of a "material determination" of formal categories in relation to the phenomena of unity, reflexivity, and what Scotus called haecceitas or "thisness".¹⁸ Here, Heidegger already draws on the phenomenology of Emil Lask, who had developed Husserl's doctrine of categorial intuition to describe the pre-theoretical or pre-cognitive givenness of categories in immediate, factual experience.¹⁹

In the course "The Idea of Philosophy and the Problem of Worldview," given in the "war emergency semester" of 1919, Heidegger takes up the problem of the "essence of worldview" and considers

¹⁵ Husserl (1929), p. 138.

¹⁶ Husserl (1929), pp. 133-136; cf. Husserl (1900/01), vol 1.

¹⁷ Husserl (1929), pp. 138-39.

¹⁸ Both dissertations are included in GA 1.

¹⁹ See, in particular, "Die Lehre vom Urteil," Part V, Chapter 2, sections 4-6 (GA 1, pp. 118-129) and "Die Kategorien- und Bedeutungslehre des Duns Scotus," (GA 1, esp. pp. 276-283). For discussions of the influence of Lask on Heidegger's thinking in these years, see van Buren (1994), especially chapters 4 and 11, Kisiel (1993), especially chapter 1, Kisiel (1995), and Crowell (2001), chapters 2 and 3.

critically the methodological and thematic views of the neo-Kantians Natorp, Rickert, and Windelband about our access to categories, the forms of judgment, and the sources of value and truth. Here, Heidegger raises a challenge to the neo-Kantian “critical-teleological” method that will become increasingly important to his own thinking and eventually merge with his developing criticism of Husserl. For the neo-Kantian “philosophy of value,” truth appears only in the category of what “holds value” [in the sense of *gelten*] or what amounts to a teleological norm for thought. Here, the category of “value” in this sense is moreover sharply distinguished from the existence of what *is* in being: the realm of what holds value and truth is conceived as wholly distinct from actual existence, and the relationship between the realms is left somewhat obscure. But, Heidegger objects, it would be impossible to determine the normativity of value and truth, or what is to be valued or taken as true, if this “normativity” did not somehow have a basis in what is given in the concreteness of actual, lived experience. Thus, according to Heidegger, “Teleological-axiomatic grounding would lose all sense *without a pre-given* chooseable and accessible *something, a what* [*ein vorgegebenes* auswählbares und überhaupt beurteilbares *Was*].”²⁰

Heidegger next attempts to determine the possibility of this “material giving” by which concrete, pre-theoretical life experience yields access to the theoretical categories and structures by means of which we can understand the structure of judgment and the possibility of truth. Here, what is thought in neo-Kantianism as the “psychic” realm of the givenness of ideals and values must be interrogated as to its own status and kind of existence: thus the whole problematic “concentrates itself” on the single question of “how the psychic is to be given as a sphere.”²¹ And since, according to Heidegger, “the theoretical itself and as such refers back to something pre-theoretical,” it is essential to determine how the structure of categories might already be given in pre-theoretical experience and in the kind of availability of objects that is displayed in ordinary, non-theoretical life.²² This demands, in particular, that we come to see concrete lived experience as a continuous temporal flow of change already endowed with meaning, not what “pass[es] in front of me like a thing” or even “a fixed process, but an ongoing event (“Ereignis”) which is neither “inner” nor “outer,” neither “physical” nor “psychical”, but rather “lives out of one’s ‘own-ness’” and only in this way.²³

How, then, does the flux of concrete experience with its event-like, appropriative character actually suffice to point toward the formal categories of judgment, being, and truth? And how might these categories actually be determined theoretically on the basis of their pre-givenness in concrete, lived experience? Heidegger sees Husserl’s phenomenology, here understood as a “pre-theoretical primordial science” as holding the answer to these problems.²⁴ In particular, a rigorous practice of “phenomenological seeing” allows the “pre-worldly” “experienceable as such” to be elicited and thereby to point toward the level of the “formally objective” which is not limited to the categories and structures of objects, but itself refers back to the “fundamental level of life in and for itself.”²⁵ The key to this

²⁰ GA 56/57, p. 41.

²¹ GA 56/57, p. 60.

²² GA 56/57, pp. 59-60.

²³ GA 56/57, p. 75.

²⁴ GA 56/57, p. 63.

²⁵ GA 56/57, p. 116.

reciprocal movement between pre-theoretic experience and theoretical recapitulation is what Heidegger calls, in the closing pages of the course, a “hermeneutical intuition” which functions as an “originary phenomenological back-and-forth formation of the receipts and precepts from which all theoretical objectification, indeed every transcendent positing, falls out.”²⁶

In the 1923 course “Ontology—The Hermeneutics of Facticity,” Heidegger further specifies the “hermeneutical” methodology of the eliciting and demonstration of the formal dimension of ontology from out of the pre-theoretical factual givenness of concretely experienced life. Emboldened by his decisive and transformative confrontation with Aristotle, Heidegger is now willing to criticize the totality of “traditional ontology” since the Greeks, as constantly having in view what is really only a specific modality of being, namely “being-an-object.” In so doing, Heidegger suggests, traditional ontology systematically blocks access to “that being [*Seienden*] which is decisive within philosophical problems,” namely Dasein itself.²⁷ In particular, Heidegger says in the course of a highly critical discussion of Max Scheler, the philosophical tradition presupposes the guideline of the traditional definition of man as “*animal rational*” and thereby places extant, objective beings in advance in “definite categorial forms” that are pre-determined by this definition.²⁸ By contrast, hermeneutics in Heidegger’s sense has as its thematic object “in each case our own Dasein in its being-there for a while at the particular time” [jeweils unser eigenes Dasein]; Heidegger defines “facticity” in terms of the “ownness” and “our own” [eigenen, Eigenheit] of this being.²⁹ He emphasizes that Dasein, so conceived, is not to be understood as “human being” in any familiar sense, or indeed as an answer to the question “what is man?”; in fact, facticity as the Dasein which is in each case our own “initially contains nothing of the ideas of “ego,” person, ego-pole, center of acts.”³⁰ Indeed, in the hermeneutics of facticity, the expressions “human Dasein” [menschliches Dasein], “human being” [Menschsein], and “being of Man” [Sein des Menschen] are explicitly to be avoided.³¹ Further, “even the concept of the self is, when employed here, not to be taken as something having its origin in an ‘ego!’ [*nicht ‘ichlichen’ Ursprings!*]³²

The critique of the humanism of the rational animal, which Heidegger voices here, will remain, in various forms, a fixture of his critical discussions of the tradition throughout much of the rest of his career. Here, although Heidegger still conceives of his own method of hermeneutical inquiry into facticity as simply an application of Husserl’s own phenomenological method of seeing, the critique nevertheless yields the terms in which he will first begin to offer some cautious criticisms of Husserl’s project, or at least of what he sees as its “misunderstanding” in the further development of the phenomenological tendency, in Husserl and others, after the *Logical Investigations*. In particular, on Heidegger’s gloss, phenomenology arises in close connection with the rapid development of psychology at the end of the 19th century, at a time when “the work of philosophy was ... applied mainly to the phenomenon of

²⁶ GA 56/57, p. 117.

²⁷ GA 63, p. 3.

²⁸ GA 63, pp. 25-26

²⁹ GA 63, p. 7, p. 21.

³⁰ GA 63, p. 29.

³¹ GA 63, p. 21, pp. 25-26.

³² GA 63, p. 29. Heidegger adds: “cf. intentionality and its *arche*”.

consciousness” and epistemology and logic were widely thought to have a psychological foundation.³³ By contrast, the *Logical Investigations* boldly asked about the kind of being possessed by the “objects about which logic speaks”; this questioning yields Husserl’s detailed study of content and meaning, as well as his decisive development of the concept of “intentionality” already suggested by Brentano. Nevertheless, Heidegger suggests, the *Logical Investigations* have largely been misunderstood, for instance as primarily a contribution to epistemology in line with neo-Kantianism, and the further development of phenomenology has exhibited four moments that jointly tend to distort its original sense and even render impossible its fundamental mode of investigation.³⁴ First, the thematic domain of “consciousness” has been “held fast” as the proper domain for phenomenological investigation and as the ur-region including the whole of the real, and this has led to a predominance of epistemological rather than ontological questions, as well as the introduction of transcendental idealism as the basic position of phenomenological research. Second, the results of the investigations which Husserl first carried out in the field of logic were unjustly applied to other domains, leading to the presupposition of a specific (and, Heidegger implies, inappropriate) model of inquiry across all fields, and third, the “drive for a system” has come to predominate. Finally, all of this has resulted in a “general watering down” that lets phenomenological research sink toward a “wishy-washiness, thoughtlessness,” and a lamentable general tendency toward mystification.

Heidegger rails against all of these trends, albeit without making completely clear which of them he attributes to Husserl himself and which to his followers in the “philosophical industry” that phenomenology has become, and calls for a revitalization of phenomenology that does not define it in terms of any privileged domain of being or fixed methodological model, but rather as “a *how of research* [*ein Wie der Forschung*] which makes the objects in question present in intuition and discusses them only to the extent that they are there in such intuition [*soweit sie anschaulich da sind*].”³⁵ This provides the essential guideline for the “hermeneutics of facticity” which always interprets the phenomena on the basis of Dasein’s “forehaving” [Vorhabe] of them as they are actually given in concrete, factual life and in the phenomena of Dasein’s “having-itself-there” [*Sichselbstdahaben*] and “always-being-in-such-a-manner” [*Immersoseins*].³⁶ In particular, Heidegger suggests: “The forehaving in which Dasein (in each case our own Dasein in its being-there for a while at the particular time) stands for this investigation can be expressed in a “formal indication” [formaler Anzeige]: *the being-there of Dasein (factual life) is being in a world*” [Dasein (faktisches Leben) ist Sein in einer Welt].³⁷ In particular, in moving from Dasein’s factual life to the formally indicated structure of this fore-having, Heidegger discovers “significance” [*Bedeutsamkeit*] in the sense of “being-there in the how of a definite signifying and pointing,” [*Dasein im Wie eines bestimmten Be-deutens*] to the “as-what” [*Als-was*] and “how” [*Wie*] of things encountered [*begegnet*].³⁸ On this basis, in a sketchy analysis that already anticipates some of the main categories of

³³ GA 63, p. 69.

³⁴ GA 63, pp. 73-74.

³⁵ GA 63, p. 72.

³⁶ GA 63, pp. 79-80.

³⁷ GA 63, p. 80.

³⁸ GA 63, p. 93.

Being and Time's first division, as the fundamental structure of Dasein's being-in-the-world, further to be articulated into the phenomena of "disclosedness," [Erschlossenheit] "familiarity" [Vertrautheit], "the unpredictable and comparative," and the "character of the world's being-encountered," including the basic relationship between "having the world there" and the phenomenon of care which is itself fundamentally linked to the peculiar temporality of "encountered" [begegnendes] Dasein.³⁹

In thus specifying the underlying structures of Dasein and world that are thus hermeneutically articulated on the basis of the fore-having characteristic of concrete life, Heidegger makes use of a methodological device that he had first introduced in the course "Introduction to the Phenomenology of Religion" of 1920-21 and which plays an essential role in specifying his method of analysis throughout the early 1920s as well as in *Being and Time*.⁴⁰ This is the device of "formal indication" [formale Anzeige]. By means of formal indication, the concreteness of factual experience points "back" to the more universal structures that are its basis in the structurally articulated phenomenon of Dasein itself. In introducing "formal indication" in the 1920-21 course, Heidegger draws on a distinction already drawn by Husserl in *Ideas 1* between two types of universalization.⁴¹ Generalization is one type: in generalization, we move from the individual objects or phenomena to their genus or type. This is to be distinguished, however, from formalization: in formalization, we do not simply move from a phenomenon to the higher genus under which it falls, but rather elicit its structure and sense, including the distinctive way in which it is given. The "formal indication" is an indication or pointer to this structure and sense, not limited to "formalization" in the sense of ordering or mathematizing, but rather capable of pointing out the more comprehensive and fundamental structure that Dasein and world shows themselves as having in the course of concrete hermeneutical (phenomenological) interpretation.⁴²

Heidegger's fullest discussion of the methodology of formal indication, in the Freiburg WS 1921-1922 course "Phenomenological Interpretations of Aristotle," comes in the course of a consideration of the task of establishing a "definition" of a special sort in response to the question: "What is philosophy?"⁴³ In connection with the special nature of philosophy as well as philosophical "objects" of investigation, it is mistaken, Heidegger argues, to impose an idea of definition which is derived from the type of definition appropriate to the objects of particular sciences and which "develops out of" formal logic in accordance with the demand of classifying the entities treated by them.⁴⁴ On this "uncritical" idea of definition, to be rejected, definition is a matter of specifying the genus and specific difference of a thing, with respect to the "conceptual structures" of the object which must already be established.⁴⁵ This

³⁹GA 63, pp. 97-102.

⁴⁰GA 60. A number of commentators have discussed the methodology of formal indication and its employment in *Being and Time*. See, e.g., Kisiel (1993), Dahlstrom (1994), van Buren (1995), Crowell (2001), Dreyfus (2002), Lafont (2002), and Shockey (2011).

⁴¹Husserl (1913), pp. 26-27.

⁴²Kisiel, pp. 165-170.

⁴³GA 61, pp. 13-36.

⁴⁴GA 61, pp. 16-17.

⁴⁵GA 61, pp. 16-17.

mode of definition is indeed appropriate, Heidegger says, for “quite definite regions of objects and for objects intended in one particular cognitive context [*erkenntnismäßig ganz bestimmt intendierte Gegenstände*].”⁴⁶ But with respect to philosophy it is essential to consider a more basic sense of definition as a “decision about or determination of something...which determination is declared, manifested, and indicated as having to be *held and believed* [*tenendum et credendum*].”⁴⁷ In particular, what is involved in phenomenological inquiry is a kind of indicating which preserves the particular way in which the object is “genuinely...possessed [*seine Weise des genuinen Gehabtwerdens*].”⁴⁸ This means that, by contrast with definition in terms of genus and species, in the kind of determination involved here, “the logic of the grasp of the object, and the conceptuality of the object in its definatory determinacy in each case [*in der jeweiligen definitorischen Bestimmtheit*] must be drawn out of the mode *in which the object is originally accessible* [wie der Gegenstand ursprünglich zugänglich wird].”⁴⁹ What is decisive in producing the possibility of this sort of definition is the basis of this givenness in “the situation of life in which the object comes to be experienced” and the “basic intention” in which, within this situation, experience already preliminarily “aims at” this object.⁵⁰

Under these constraints, Heidegger introduces the “formal indication” explicitly as a kind of definition that includes a “very definite bond [*ganz bestimmte Bindung*]” to the object, one that means that in it, the indicator herself stands in a “quite definite direction of approach [*einer ganz bestimmten Ansatzrichtung*]” to it. Here, Heidegger says, the “formal” character of the “formal indication” means, decisively, that the object is indicated, along with its particular mode of proper and original access, in such a “binding” way. The “existentiell” sense of the “formal” itself is not to be understood as resting in the familiar opposition of the formal to the material, or indeed in the “eidetic” in the sense of the “universal generality,” but rather as just this binding character of the indicated “approach” to the object on the basis of its givenness in factual life.⁵¹ This “formal” character of the formal indication is itself, according to Heidegger, thus inseparable from its being an “indication” – that is, something which (as opposed to, for example, a mere description or external definition) points indexically toward something that is itself “there,” though at first in an inexplicit and non-conceptual fashion, in the concrete life of the indicator herself.⁵² In the formal indication, the object which is thus already possessed in an “inauthentic” mode in ordinary life is recovered in a way that points toward the “temporalization” or “maturation” [*Zeitigung*] of a more authentic mode of the possession of it.⁵³ This taking possession is itself “in a radical sense” a “being” of the “temporalization” of existence.⁵⁴ What is developed and grasped in this development on the basis of the approach is not necessarily or simply the full and

⁴⁶ GA 61, p. 17.

⁴⁷ GA 61, p. 17 (Heidegger gives the formulation in Latin).

⁴⁸ GA 61, p. 18.

⁴⁹ GA 61, p. 20. (trans. slightly modified).

⁵⁰ GA 61, p. 20.

⁵¹ GA 61, p. 33.

⁵² GA 61, p. 34.

⁵³ GA 61, p. 34.

⁵⁴ “Die eigentliche Haben ist bei manchen Gegenständen in einem radikalen Sinn ein Sein, d. h. das spezifische Sein des je Vollzughaften, der Zeitigung für die Existenz.” (GA 61, p. 34).

complete presentation of the object, but (also) the specific way in which it is already *given* in the situation that provides access to it, including, Heidegger says, the essential “questionableness” [*Fraglichkeit*] of this givenness.⁵⁵ As applied to “oneself and life,” this questionability is, Heidegger suggests, the “authentic foundation of philosophy,” to be grasped and temporalized in a “radical” and “existentiell” way.⁵⁶

In connection with the hermeneutic, interpretive method of inquiry that Heidegger had developed by 1923 and would continue to employ in *Being and Time*, the formal indication provides a methodological way of clarifying, on the basis of given, factual experience, more unitary, underlying and constitutive structures of Dasein as such. As we have seen, these structures, as shown in the formal indication, are not abstractly described forms or categories of human life or of entities in general, but rather the structures of what we must, constitutively, recognize in each case as *our own* Dasein, here interrogated hermeneutically as to its ontologically underlying structure. The indication is also, as we have seen, such as to include the particular character and way in which the indicated phenomenon is accessible or capable of being “possessed” in and through this structure. In this way the methodology of formal indication continues to develop the underlying idea of the phenomenological investigation of intuitive givenness: that of an analysis of the conditions under which a phenomena is directly present or presented in experience or thought. But despite its basis, in each case, in the singular factual life, the formal indication, however, remains *formal* in the particular sense of the bond that it provides back to its ontologically underlying structure and thereby to the particular phenomena characteristic of that life in their own characteristic ways of being given there. With respect to Husserl’s discussion of categorial intuition as well as the whole tradition it summarizes, this amounts to a radical and different way of understanding the dimension of the “formal” itself and its own possible givenness. In particular, as we have seen, rather than understanding the givenness of form, as Husserl still does, as a matter of the intuition or knowledge of certain *particular* objects, or indeed as an “abstractive” separation of formal moments from a neutral or underlying matter, the methodology of formal indication provides the basis for hermeneutically clarifying and understanding the phenomena of factual life as they are given in themselves.

The question that Plato originally formulated as that of the basis for the figuring of forms (in the sense of ideas) in thought and sensible experience is thereby put on a new and ontologically transformed footing. Here, the question of the givenness of form is no longer that of the availability of the peculiar objects of thought that also determine the properties of extant objects, but rather that of the interpretation of the concrete phenomena of life as they are given both to experience and to thought. With this hermeneutic clarification of the givenness of the formal dimension of the various constitutive phenomena of Dasein, the structure and form of their possible givenness is interrogated at the same time, so that the phenomena are neither understood in “objective” abstraction from their own proper givenness, nor made to conform or be reduced, in idealist fashion, to the conditions imposed by it. The result is a hermeneutic methodology of formalizing that can, as we shall see in more detail in the

⁵⁵ GA 61, p. 34.

⁵⁶ GA 61, p. 35.

following chapters, concretely clarify the underlying phenomena of sense, truth, and time as they figure in Dasein's concrete life and are there given to be experienced and thought.

Decisively for the current investigation, to employ this formalizing methodology in connection with these phenomena is not, as Heidegger indeed already emphasizes, to reduce them to their description in terms of the structures or principles of a "formal" or purely symbolic logic. Rather, as we shall see in more detail in the next chapter, the "formal indication" in Heidegger's precise sense provides a specific methodological basis on which it is possible to clarify the sense of the "formal" itself as it figures in the motivation and application of what is typically today called "formal" (or "symbolic" or "mathematical") logic to clarify the structure of linguistic meaning and truth. This eminently includes, as we shall see, the specific relationship of this logic to the structure of what its modern founder, Frege, conceives under the heading of "modes of presentation" as *senses*. In connection with the structure of linguistic sense thus understood, it is once again insufficient, as we shall see, to understand the "formal" as the maximally general, or to conceive of the "formal" character of formal logic as residing in its capacity of abstracting a set of empty but maximally universal binding procedures of thought, language, or reality. Rather, the particular phenomena and interrelationships of sense, truth, and time must be interrogated in their own particular modes of givenness, both as they are present in concrete experience and as they can be conceptually articulated and thought. To interrogate them in this way is not only to interpret them on the basis of the structure of their givenness in factual life and but also in light of the illumination of this basis that can be provided, in each case, by the symbolic structures formally indicated in them as they are there given. In connection, in particular, with the traditional determination of the "formal" as well as the "mathematical" as the domain of the timeless or extra-temporal, this provides, as we shall see, the methodological basis for the substantial deconstruction of the metaphysical interpretation of the relationship of thought and time on which this traditional determination is based. Further, it allows for the indication of the more basic problematic on the basis of which this metaphysical interpretation is visible as but one determined solution, among many possible others.

III

By 1923, Heidegger was thus already in essential possession of the distinctive methodology for the elicitation of the formal structure of Dasein that he would employ in the "Preparatory Fundamental Analysis of Dasein" that comprises Division I of *Being and Time*. Over the next several years, his further radicalization of the methodology first suggested by Husserl for the demonstration of what were for him the atemporal categories of being, would lead Heidegger to undertake a devastating critique of his erstwhile teacher and to penetratingly re-open the most fundamental questions concealed beneath the traditional determination of the senses of being and time. This route from Husserlian phenomenology to this dramatic re-opening of the fundamental questions of philosophy is most evident in two courses from the period immediately preceding the finalization of *Being and Time*: the course "History of the Concept of Time: Prolegomena to a phenomenology of History and Nature" [*Prolegomena zur Geschichte des Zeitbegriffs*] from 1925, and the comprehensive "Logic: The Question of Truth" [*Logik:*

Die Frage Nach der Wahrheit] of 1925-26.⁵⁷ In these courses, we can witness not only the methodologically instructive “back-story” to the use of the phenomenological method in *Being and Time*, but also, beyond this, the way in which the guiding question of the givenness of form which Heidegger posed to existing phenomenology along with the whole preceding philosophical tradition led him to re-open the basic question of time itself.

In the 1925 course “History of the Concept of Time,” Heidegger focuses his explication of phenomenology on the interpretation, and deepening, of what he sees as its three most important discoveries so far. The first is the discovery of intentionality as the basic structure of “lived experiences [*Erlebnisse*] as such” that makes possible all judging, meaning, and understanding.⁵⁸ Here, Heidegger emphasizes the inadequacy of representational theories of awareness and consciousness: in a simple intentional act of perception, for instance the perceiving of the chair before me, there is no secondary representation of the object but rather simply the direct presence in perception of the chair itself.⁵⁹ More generally, according to Heidegger, intentionality is deeply misinterpreted if it is understood as a relationship between the distinct spheres of the psychic and the physical.⁶⁰ This misinterpretation, ultimately drawn from the ontology of the natural sciences, fundamentally mischaracterizes the actual nature of intentionality, which is that of a basic structure of comportment in which objects and phenomena may, for instance in perception, be given directly “in bodily presence,” [*in Leibhaftigkeit*] just as they are in themselves.⁶¹ Nevertheless, Heidegger suggests, the existing phenomenological theory of intentionality, in identifying it with the psychic in general and in construing it “simply as a structure of consciousness or of acts, of the person,” has left the basic character of the “psychic” essentially obscure.⁶² Along with this, Heidegger suggests, it has failed to clarify the basic relationship of the “being-intended” of an entity to that entity itself.⁶³

The second major discovery which Heidegger sees phenomenology as having made is that of categorial intuition. Heidegger here rehearses Husserl’s conception of evidence as the “identifying synthesis” of fulfillment and of truth as adequation, or the “being-identical” of what is intended and what is intuited [*Identischsein von Vermeintem und Angeschautem*].⁶⁴ But already in this conception, Heidegger suggests, there is a basic and important ambiguity.⁶⁵ According to Husserl’s theory, in a successful intentional act that attains truth, the meaning-intention is actually brought into coincidence with the fulfilling intuition of its object; this is the actual performance of the “act of identification” of the meant and the intuited. Is, then, truth to be identified with the (presumably atemporal) “subsistence” [*Bestand*] of the standing *relationship* of identity between what is intended *in* the act – its “content” or

⁵⁷ GA 20 and 21.

⁵⁸ GA 20, p. 36.

⁵⁹ GA 20, pp. 48-49.

⁶⁰ GA 20, pp. 37-39.

⁶¹ GA 20, pp. 53-55

⁶² GA 20, p. 62.

⁶³ GA 20, p. 63.

⁶⁴ GA 20, p. 69.

⁶⁵ GA 20, pp. 69-71.

what is “meant” in it -- and what is actually given? Or is it rather to be identified with the actual, particular and datable *act* of bringing-together of the intention and the intended? In the first case, truth will be the standing, always-possible correlate of a possible act of correlation or identification, but will not be identified with any one such act; in the second, by contrast, it will be an aspect or achievement of such a temporally specific act itself.

In fact, according to Heidegger, these two possibilities for understanding truth have never been clearly distinguished within phenomenology. But the confusion can be avoided if we understand truth in a third, more basic sense, one that refers neither to a subsisting relation of abstract identity between intention and fulfillment, nor to the actual performance of any act of identification. This third and (according to Heidegger) more basic sense of truth is one grounded in the intuited entity itself, which itself “provides the demonstration” of the truth of any assertion or statement about it.⁶⁶ This is, Heidegger suggests, “the concept of truth which also emerged very early in Greek philosophy”; it is the concept of truth as *aletheia* or the unconcealment of the entity itself, which Heidegger here suggests means that “Truth here comes down to *being*, to *being-real* [*Wahrheit besagt hier soviel wie Sein, Wirklich-Sein*].”⁶⁷

Despite this fundamental objection to the treatment of truth in Husserl’s phenomenology, Heidegger nevertheless continues to emphasize the crucial importance of Husserl’s discovery of categorial intuition for the actual interpretation of the sense of being itself. With categorial intuition, Heidegger suggests, Husserl has taken an essential leap forward, beyond empiricist, idealist, and subjectivist theories of consciousness and representation, precisely in that he has shown that “the non-sensory and the ideal cannot without further ado be identified with the immanent, conscious, subjective.”⁶⁸ Indeed, the categorial structures demonstrated by categorial intuition, which always intrinsically “pervade” every act of even simple perception, are “nothing like consciousness”, but instead amount to a “special kind of objectivity” (p. 59), one which allows the objects and matters given in simple acts to be “disclosed *anew*, such that these objects come to explicit apprehension exactly as they are.”⁶⁹ Husserl has thus discovered in categorial intuition the actual possibility of accessing an objective dimension of form, whereby the actually existing state of affairs can be “characterized as a specific relation [*eine bestimmte Beziehung*] whose members give what is articulated in them the form of subject and predicate.”⁷⁰ This shows that “objectivity in its broadest sense is much richer than the reality [*Realität*] of a thing,” but also includes the objective and objectively given formal structures that underlie the non-sensory moments and relations of any structured state of affairs, including the structure of the copula that links subject to predicate in a predicative judgment.⁷¹

⁶⁶ GA 20, p. 71.

⁶⁷ GA 20, p. 71.

⁶⁸ GA 20, p. 78.

⁶⁹ GA 20, p. 80, p. 84.

⁷⁰ GA 20, p. 87.

⁷¹ GA 20, p. 89.

But although Heidegger thus sees categorial intuition as pointing toward the possibility of the givenness and intuitive presentation of an original and objective dimension of form, further interrogation of the status and possibility of this givenness now lead Heidegger to what is perhaps his most decisive and central criticism of Husserl's phenomenology as a whole. Husserl's development of categorial intuition, in connection with the phenomenological theory of intentionality and the later distinction between the real (noetic) and the ideal (noematic) aspects of acts, has elicited an original givenness of what Husserl understands as the "ideal," the actuality of forms and categories that are given to consciousness in categorial intuition without being, for him, in any way real or temporal. But what Husserl has fundamentally failed to do is to clarify fundamentally the relationship of this posited "ideal" realm to the *real* temporal flow of consciousness itself.

In the *Logic: The Question of Truth* course, Heidegger accordingly ventures to raise the question of the ideal and the real in phenomenology in a sense more radical, and penetrating, than Husserl has been able to. In the critique of psychologism begun in the "Prolegomena to Pure Logic" at the beginning of the *Logical Investigations*, Heidegger suggests, Husserl has indeed decisively pointed out the fundamental shortcomings of a naturalism that remains rooted in "blindness to the non-empirical" and to "propositional content [*Satzgehalt*] as such," which means, for Husserl, "ideal being."⁷² In criticizing psychologism in these terms, Heidegger suggests, Husserl has pointed to the "fundamental error" involved in psychologism's failure to recognize the "difference" [Unterschieds] of a "basic differentiation in the being of entities" [Grundverschiedenheit im Sein des Seienden] which is indeed the proper ontological basis of logic itself.⁷³ Indeed, here Husserl's critique is so successful that "today we can hardly conceive...how anyone could believe that we could understand anything about the logical structure of what is thought as such – the "thought – by way of a psychological study of thinking."⁷⁴ Nevertheless, although the critique of psychologism must certainly be deemed successful in pointing out fundamental distinctions of being wholly overlooked by naturalistic accounts, it is in fact far from certain that Husserl's understanding of the sense and structure of judgments as founded in "ideal" being is sufficient. For in order to gain actual clarity about this structure, it will be necessary for phenomenology to clarify the possibility of ideal, timeless structures being given in temporal consciousness. In fact, Heidegger suggests, the phenomenological critique of psychologism has in certain ways even *increased* the "danger" of a fundamental mis-interpretation of the relationship between "mental" acts of judgment and their "ideal" content:

That is, philosophy will be forced to confront the question of what kind of explanation it really has with this 'psychic' [*was es den nun eigentlich für eine Bewandnis hat mit diesem Psychischen*]. [This is the question] whether this accomplishment of judging [*dieser Urteilsvollzug*], its enactment [*der Vollzug der Urteils*], or the assertion [*der Aussage*] can be simply dismissed as something real, psychical, [*etwas Reales, Psychisches*] as contrasted with a so-called ideal sense, or whether in the end a wholly different dimension of being does not

⁷² GA 21, p. 50

⁷³ GA 21, p. 50 (transl. slightly modified).

⁷⁴ GA 21, p. 50.

come to the fore [*ob nicht am Ende eine ganz andersartige Seinsdimension sich vordrängt*], one that can certainly be very dangerous once we have taken it into view and emphasized it as something fundamental. Thus we could say that as clear as this critique of psychologism is, from the outset, on the guideline of the distinction between real and ideal being, nonetheless the positive questions that now press forward from this distinction are just as difficult. [These are] questions that did not emerge first of all in the nineteenth or twentieth centuries, but rather ones that already engaged Greek philosophy, especially Plato. This difference is none other than the Platonic one between the sensible being [*dem sinnlichen Sein*], the *aistheton*, and the being as it is accessible through reason or *nous*: the *noeton* [*dem Sein, wie es durch Vernunft zugänglich wird, durch den nous, das noeton*]. The questioning today takes up again [the questioning about] the participation of the real in the ideal, the *methexis*, and it is questionable whether or not we can get clear on the phenomenon of thinking, of the thought, and more broadly of truth, by way of stating the problem in these terms.⁷⁵

In simply presupposing the “Platonic” distinction between the ideal realm of form as timeless and the temporal realm of the sensory, Husserl has, despite the fundamental usefulness of the methods and tools of phenomenological research that he has introduced, ultimately failed to clarify the obscure sense or senses of being that actually underlie the kinds of demonstration that phenomenology can achieve.

Heidegger further suggests that Husserl’s simple presupposition of the ideal/real distinction, which he fails along with the rest of the philosophical tradition to clarify, is in fact grounded in another failing, one which is ultimately responsible for what Heidegger sees as the decline of phenomenology into transcendental idealism, subjectivity, and an ultimately “personalistic” attitude that fails fundamentally to elucidate the very categories it presupposes. In particular, Heidegger suggests in the 1925 course, Husserl finally understands “pure consciousness” as the ultimate region of being, in which all others – the being of the real and spatiotemporal as well as that of the ideal – are constituted and given sense. But in so doing, Husserl has in fact *failed* to inquire into the “being of this region”, the actual ontological status of the “ur-region” of consciousness itself.⁷⁶ Specifically, in thinking of consciousness as the ultimate region of the givenness of and constitution of being, Husserl has failed to inquire into the actual possibility of the subject of such consciousness himself to exist as a “real human being,” concretely and factually existing in a world. (p. 101).

This leaves the status of “transcendental subjectivity”, as Husserl conceives of it, radically ambiguous. On the one hand, the consciousness of the subject appears as the transcendental, ultimate, and pure region in which all sense, being, and the world itself is constituted. But on the other, in accordance with a “personalistic” tendency that Heidegger sees as first exemplified in Husserl’s 1910 essay “Phenomenology as a Rigorous Science” and increasingly marked in Husserl’s work since then as well as (with somewhat different emphases) in Scheler’s.⁷⁷ On this position, whatever one may say about the

⁷⁵ GA 21, p. 52 (transl. slightly modified).

⁷⁶ GA 20, p. 140.

⁷⁷ GA 20, pp. 164-68; pp. 174-76.

nature of transcendental consciousness itself, the really existing entity that is *capable* of this transcendent consciousness is conceived as simply a natural, biological being to which rationality and consciousness are somehow adjoined.⁷⁸ This is, of course, not simply equivalent to the naturalistic position that Husserl has so adamantly opposed. But nevertheless, Heidegger suggests, it once again takes its orientation fundamentally from the traditional definition of man as the “animal rationale,” the organism, in itself simply natural, to which reason, *logos*, or spirit is secondarily somehow added as a kind of extrinsic possession.⁷⁹ Within this framework, moreover, the reality of the *psuche* and its concrete acts of intentionality, though of course rigorously distinguished from the ideality of their content, nevertheless themselves appear to have the kind of status and temporality of natural objects and processes, wherein “every entity is taken *a priori* as a lawfully regulated flow of occurrences in the spatio-temporal exteriority of the world.”⁸⁰ What is missing in this whole conception is, once again, a more penetrating inquiry into the kind of being of the entity thus specified, and the “primary experience of the being of man” [*primäre Erfahrung des Seins des Menschen*] characteristic of it.⁸¹

The redirection of the inquiry toward the actual being of Dasein has the further consequence that in it, truth can no longer be treated as resting in the agreement, correlation, or correspondence of entities. Whether the relationship in which truth is thought to consist is seen as that between a physical object and its mental or psychological correlate, or rather (as with Husserl) as that between an ideal content and its fulfillment in the real psychic act, the whole conception of truth as grounded in relation here must cede, Heidegger argues, to a more basic understanding of truth in terms of the unconcealment of entities themselves. In the “Logic” course, Heidegger further clarifies the implications of such an understanding of truth for the availability of entities and situations and for the structure of the logic of assertions and propositions. In particular, the truth and falsity of all propositions and assertions is based in a *prior* level of the availability of beings that is itself grounded in the “world-openness” of Dasein which also, reciprocally, makes “the world” open for it.⁸² On this level, the disclosing [Aufschluß] of an entity does not yet have the propositionally articulated structure of predication and the copula, but is simply a direct “‘having’ of something *as* something [*ein “Haben” von etwas als etwas*].”⁸³ This primary “as-structure” is what Heidegger calls the “hermeneutical ‘as’” to distinguish it from the secondary, “apophantic” “as-structure” of the articulated assertion; crucially, the original, hermeneutical “as” characterizes the kind of availability involved in coping and handling of everyday objects and situations, and so may be considered to precede and condition the explicit formation of predicative judgments.⁸⁴ This allows Heidegger to oppose any correspondence theory of truth, and indeed suggest that there is no need to conceive of truth as a “relationship” at all:

⁷⁸ GA 20, p. 173.

⁷⁹ GA 20, p. 173.

⁸⁰ GA 20, pp. 155-56.

⁸¹ GA 20, p. 174.

⁸² “Dasein ist an ihm selbst von Hause aus welt-offen, offen für die Welt, die ihrerseits aufgeschlossen ist.” (GA 21, p. 143).

⁸³ GA 21, p. 144 (transl. slightly modified).

⁸⁴ GA 21, pp. 144-45.

Truth is not a present relationship [*vorhandenes Verhältnis*] between two entities that are present [*zwischen zwei Seienden, die vorhanden sind*], for instance as psychical and physical. It is also no coordination [*Zuordnung*], as one loves to say these days. If it is a relationship [*Verhältnis*] at all, it is one that has no analogies with any kind of relation [*Beziehung*] between entities. It is – if one can put it this way -- the relationship [*Verhältnis*] of Dasein as Dasein to its very world, the world-openness [*Weltoffenheit*] of Dasein, that is itself uncovered – Dasein whose being toward the world [*Sein zur Welt*] itself is disclosed [*aufgeschlossen*] in and with this being toward its world [*Sein zu ihr*].⁸⁵

IV

As we have seen, this clarification of the original possibility for worldly existence and the disclosure of significance is just what Heidegger takes himself to have gained through his original description of Dasein and the hermeneutic method of displaying it by means of formal indication of its structures. This methodology is itself derived from Husserl's phenomenology and in particular from the innovation of categorial intuition. But in turning these methods toward the question of the actual sense of being, Heidegger can suggest that Husserl himself has essentially failed to take them far enough. Heidegger's own radicalized phenomenological method, by contrast, is capable of eliciting the actual structure of the being, the entity, in whose structure the formal possibilities of meaning, judgment, and truth are originally given. As such, the methodology of hermeneutic interpretation and formal indication provides Heidegger's own answer to the problem of the givenness of form, or of the availability of the constitutive categories of meaning and truth to intuition and experience in its concrete, temporal flow.

Nevertheless, as Heidegger recognizes, all of this still leaves open the essential question of *temporality* itself. In particular, Husserl along with the entirety of the tradition conceive of the relationship of the ideal to the real as the relationship between two regions determinable most basically in terms of their temporality: the ideal is the region of the timeless, whereas the real is in time. The problem at the root of Heidegger's objections to Husserl's project is that of finding a way to cross the gap between these two "regions"; this is none other than the problem of finding a way for what is conceived as atemporal, ideal form really to enter into, to be given in, temporally flowing reality. In fact, Heidegger suggests, once we conceive of the givenness of form as a matter of the figuring of atemporal ideals within temporal reality, this problem is basically insoluble: there is no coherent way to bridge the gap between the ideal realm of form and the real realm of temporal life it shapes, once these are distinguished as distinct regions, the one atemporal and the other within time. But this does not at all mean that Heidegger wishes simply to absorb form into the temporality of empirical life or return to the psychologistic assimilation of the givenness of form to datable acts of the empirical psyche. Rather, he undertakes instead to interrogate in a more basic sense the very givenness of time itself.

⁸⁵ GA 21, p. 164 (transl. modified).

To clarify what is involved in this interrogation, Heidegger once again draws centrally upon Husserl's phenomenological methods, developing them in the direction of a deeper posing of the question of the very sense and meaning of being as determined by time. In the *History of the Concept of Time* course, Heidegger presents as the third fundamental breakthrough of phenomenology (the first two are its discoveries of intentionality and categorial intuition) the discovery of the "original sense of the a priori." Assuredly, the notion of the *apriori* as "that which already always is the earlier [*was von früher her schon ist*]" is already marked in Plato's understanding of the distinctive mode of existence of the forms, and in Descartes and Kant this "a priori" is thought in terms of the priority of the subject, as that which comes before and forms the basis for knowledge of objects.⁸⁶ Nevertheless, according to Heidegger, it was left to phenomenology to identify, with its distinctive invocation of categorial intuition and its essential reference to the demonstration of ideality, to discover an *a priori* that is "not limited to subjectivity," and indeed "has primarily nothing at all to do with subjectivity."⁸⁷ In fact, Heidegger suggests, despite Husserl's own official understanding of the categories as constituted in the category of "transcendental subjectivity," the real significance of the discovery of categorial intuition is ultimately to make it clear that "something like the highlighting of ideas occurs both in the field of the ideal, hence of the categories, and in the field of the real."⁸⁸ In this sense, the a priori is not, Heidegger suggests, the determinant of a specific mode or region of entities but rather an exemplary indication of one of the senses of being as such: it is "not a title for comportment, but a *title for being* [*kein Titel des Verhaltens, sondern ein Titel des Seins*]."⁸⁹

Heidegger thus sees in Husserl's discovery of the "original sense of the a priori" a first and leading indication of the radical possibility of something like a disclosure of the sense of being as such, one that owes nothing to the being of any specific entity, including that of the subject. In particular, if the *a priori* as disclosed through categorial intuition or its radicalized form, namely formal indication, is indeed completely indifferent to subjectivity, then it also has nothing to do with epistemology or the order of knowledge, nor to the serial ordering of beings as "earlier" and "later". Rather, according to Heidegger, it indicates an essential structure feature of being in itself:

Thus the first thing demonstrated by phenomenology is *the universal scope of the a priori*. The second is *the specific indifference of the a priori with respect to subjectivity*. The third is included in the first two: the way of access [*die Zugangsart*] to the *a priori*. Inasmuch as the *a priori* is in each case [*jeweils*] grounded in domains of subject matter and of being [*den Sach- und Seinsgebieten*], it is in itself demonstrable in a simple intuition. It is not inferred indirectly, surmised from some symptoms in the real, hypothetically reckoned ... This leads to a fourth specification of the *a priori*: the "earlier" is not a feature in the ordered sequence of knowing [*in der Ordnungsfolge des Erkennens*], but it is also not a feature in the sequential order of entities [*der Folgeordnung des Seienden*], more precisely in the sequential order of the emergence of an

⁸⁶ GA 20, pp. 99-100.

⁸⁷ GA 20, p. 101.

⁸⁸ GA 20, p. 101.

⁸⁹ GA 20, p. 101.

entity from an entity. Instead, the *a priori* is a *feature of the structural sequence in the being of entities [der Aufbaufolge im Sein des Seienden], in the ontological structure of being [in der Seinsstruktur des Seins].*⁹⁰

In particular, if, as Heidegger suggests, the historical “discovery of the *a priori* is really connected or actually identical with the discovery of the concept of being [*der Entdeckung des Seinsbegriffes*] in Parmenides or in Plato,” it is necessary in reconsidering the “prevalence of this particular concept of being” to re-open a radical interrogation into the temporality presupposed in this traditional concept of being, the concept of being as presence that has constantly been presupposed since the Greeks.⁹¹

Heidegger is thus led, finally, to take up once more the question of the possible givenness of the *a priori* dimension of the formal determination of the structures of the disclosedness and meaning of being, this time along the guideline of the essential question of the givenness of time itself. In the *Logic* course, Heidegger opens this interrogation by identifying the essential connection that links the problem of truth to the temporality of being in Aristotle’s *Metaphysics*. In particular, Heidegger suggests, Aristotle’s analysis in *Metaphysics* IX 10 shows that the being of a being is, for him, essentially a matter of the unity of a gathering that must itself be understood as a matter of co-presence or presenting:

Our question is: What does *being* mean such that *truth* can be understood as a *character of being [Was besagt Sein, damit Wahrheit als Seinscharakter verstanden werden kann]*? As we have pointed out, the ontological determination of the synthetic [entity] [*die Seinsbestimmung des Beisammen*], which Aristotle introduced in *Metaphysics* IX 10, means presence at hand [*Vorhandenheit*], in the sense of the presence-together [*Mitvorhandenheit*] of something with something in the *unity* of something present at hand [*eines Vorhandenen*]. This, however -- namely this primary presence at hand that founds presence-together -- must be understood as *presence, presenting [Anwesenheit, Präsenz]*.⁹²

For Aristotle in particular, existing beings as the subjects of predication are capable of being revealed in truth only insofar as they can be synthesized or unified on the basis of the everlasting *stoichea*, or simple elements whose own mode of existence is conceived as eternal and as constantly underlying all possibility of change. This synthesis or unification that makes disclosure in truth possible, however, is itself a presenting; and the ultimate sense of this presenting for Aristotle is a ‘rendering present’ or ‘making present’ that means the same as “letting a present being encounter us in a now-moment [*Anwesendes in eine Gegenwart begegnen lassen*].”⁹³ This determination links the being of something disclosed in truth, in a fundamental way, to a particular determination of time: “To understand being as presence [*als Anwesenheit*] on the basis of the present [*aus der Gegenwart*] means to understand being in terms of time [*aus der Zeit*].”⁹⁴ Specifically, Heidegger suggests, this is the determination of time

⁹⁰ GA 20, p. 102.

⁹¹ GA 20, 102.

⁹² GA 21, p. 191 (transl. slightly altered).

⁹³ GA 21, p. 192.

⁹⁴ GA 21, p. 193.

developed by Aristotle and constantly presupposed in the tradition since he wrote. On this determination, time consists in a constantly flowing sequence of presents or now-moments and the presence of anything is basically its presence in one of these moments or in an unchanging and unchangeable constancy, its “presence-now”.⁹⁵ To gain clarity about the problem of being, Heidegger suggests, it is therefore necessary to inquire into its relationship to the determination of time.

This provides the basis for Heidegger to turn, in part II of the course, to the deeper analysis of the “abyssal problematic [abgründigen Problematik]” which now opens up with respect to being and time.⁹⁶ In particular, if the analysis of Aristotle has elicited that “truth, being, and consequently falsehood, synthesis, and assertion are in some kind of, up until now, wholly obscure sense, connected [*im Zusammenhang*] with the phenomenon of time,” this recognition points toward a phenomenological investigation of the characteristics of truth, falsehood, synthesis and statement whereby they are grounded in a more basic *temporal* determination.⁹⁷ This “phenomenological chronology,” Heidegger clarifies, will not characterize the phenomena simply in terms of how they are temporal [*Zeitlich*] in that they “run their course in time”; rather, it will aim to elucidate their more fundamental temporal determinedness of the phenomena by means of a basic study of temporality itself.⁹⁸ Kant, Heidegger says, is the only philosopher up to the present to have even suspected the possibility of such an investigation but even Kant was kept from “understanding... the idea” of a phenomenological chronology by the rigidity of his distinction between the sensibility and the understanding and by his having understood the character of time as “primarily and solely related to nature.”⁹⁹ In particular, if Kant has essentially followed Aristotle in determining time as the countable time of natural processes and as “something just there on hand,” [*vorfindlich*] the task that falls to phenomenological chronology is that of asking whether there are other possible determinations of the overall character of time, and in particular whether the hermeneutically basic “as-structure” itself has a basic temporal significance that is lost in the Aristotelian conception of truth as the unity of synthesis or co-presence in the now.¹⁰⁰

In Kant’s Transcendental Analytic, time is a “form of intuition”, and in fact the most general form, underlying the appearances of both “inner” and “outer” sense. This means, according to Heidegger, that in every appearance, “time is the unthematized and antecedently (i.e. pure) presented whereupon of a regard in the letting of a manifold to meet the senses [*Worauf des Hinblicks im Begegnenlassen des Mannigfaltigen der Sinne*].”¹⁰¹ This raises the question whether time, beyond simply being a form of appearance or intuition, can itself be intuited or presented, according to Kant, or more generally what kind of “presence” is involved in the formal apriority of this “unthematic and antecedent” basis. In fact, Heidegger suggests, Kant here obscurely suspects an original givenness of time (in the sense in which it is the “form” of inner and outer sense) as a “whereupon of regard [*Worauf des Hinblicks*]” a givenness

⁹⁵ GA 21, p. 193.

⁹⁶ GA 21, p. 193 (transl. slightly altered).

⁹⁷ GA 21, p. 198.

⁹⁸ GA 21, p. 199.

⁹⁹ GA 21, p. 203.

¹⁰⁰ GA 21, p. 205.

¹⁰¹ GA 21, pp. 275-76 (transl. slightly altered).

which, if correctly understood, would have pointed directly back toward a more original determination of temporality itself.¹⁰² However, because Kant still, following Descartes, conceived of the *a priori* as primarily the realm of the subject and in particular of what is given in it, including the forms of space and time, as results of the *acts* of the subject in intuiting them, he misses this original givenness of time and the incipient phenomenological demonstration gets “mixed up” with the dogma of a subjectivism that will “later smother it.”¹⁰³

Similarly, in turning toward the deduction and availability of the categories of the understanding, Heidegger argues, Kant’s conception of the pre-formation of the conditions of the possibility of objective knowledge again points to the problem of the givenness of time. Here, Kant understands knowledge as essentially arising from the “two stems” of sensibility and the understanding: this carries forward the traditional distinction, already present in Aristotle, between aesthesis and noesis, what is given directly to the senses and what is thinkable by the mind, as separable types or factors of knowing.¹⁰⁴ Here, in order for what is sensorily given to be knowable as an object or objectivity, it is necessary that what is given in sensibility be further determined by the categories of thought. Kant understands the determination essentially as an ordering and a synthesis, the synthesis of a “manifold” of appearances which can give unity to the objects thus understood. In the Analogies of Experience, in particular, Kant understands the formal ordering of the manifold of appearances into temporal order as an aspect of the unification of appearances and judgments, which is ultimately determined by the unity of transcendental apperception.¹⁰⁵ This is the unity of the “I think,” which according to Kant must be able to be combined with all of my representations. This requirement raises a fundamental question about the way time is given for Kant: “What is the condition of the possibility of the determinability of time as such in an “I think”? Or even more precisely: What is the condition of the possibility that time as such and an “I think” can be together?”¹⁰⁶ The answer points in the direction of a primordial givenness that Kant figures as the synthetic action of the subject, without, however, being able to further clarify its fundamental structure. More generally, for Kant, “Givenness as such is possible only in a ‘for’ that is constituted by an original synthesis that is expressed as the “I think.”¹⁰⁷ But this *a priori* givenness is itself possible only insofar as the understanding, in the “I think”, is directed toward appearances given in the original form of time.

In each of these cases – the pre-given basis of the forms of intuition of inner and outer sense, the formal basis of the synthesis of the manifold to produce temporally ordered objectivity, and the formal combinability of representations in the transcendental unity of the “I think” – Heidegger thus interrogates the possibility and necessity of the givenness of form and finds it to lie in a more original givenness of time. In each of these cases, form is the “whereupon of regard” or “pre-viewed basis” entailed by the very idea of ordering, what renders coherent the possibility of any appearance or

¹⁰² GA 21, p. 281 (transl. slightly altered).

¹⁰³ GA 21, p. 278.

¹⁰⁴ GA 21, pp. 282-83.

¹⁰⁵ GA 21, pp. 308-310.

¹⁰⁶ GA 21, p. 309.

¹⁰⁷ GA 21, p. 333.

understanding. Although Kant cannot himself see the deeper and more original problem that opens up here with respect to the givenness of this basis, it is in fact already implicit, Heidegger suggests, in the very question of the sense of the “a priori” which is operative in relation to the guiding question of the first Critique as a whole, that of the possibility of synthetic *a priori* knowledge.

In fact, Heidegger now ventures to suggest, the synthetic character of this knowledge here points the way to a more original givenness of time. On this conception, one that is no longer in any sense at all drawn from natural relations or the schematization of their order, what Kant determines as the *a priori* of the transcendental subject *reflexively* provides to *itself* the very temporal forms which themselves make possible all givenness. If, as Heidegger had earlier argued, the ultimate basis of given time for Kant is the “whereupon of a regard” which makes it possible for anything in general to be encountered in temporal order by the mind or self, then time is accordingly the “condition of possibility for anything to be given in the articulated form of one-after-another [*daß überhaupt Gebendes sich geben kann in der Artikulation des Nacheinander*].”¹⁰⁸ The condition of time is, in this sense, “the way in which the mind lets itself be given anything at all.” But this condition is itself, for Kant, provided to the self or mind by virtue of its own original act; in the reflexive movement in which the self supplies itself with the formal basis of its own forms of possibly being encountered, it provides the very condition of all givenness. This condition is, in other words, nothing other than time as “original, universal, pure self-affection.”¹⁰⁹

In this analysis of how time is presupposed in each of the major parts of Kant’s project, Heidegger thus recapitulates the decisive question of the givenness of form he discovers his answer in the original givenness of time, in such a way to elicit original time as the ultimate formal basis of givenness itself. In each case, moreover, Heidegger rejects Kant’s tendency to think of this ultimate form in terms of the action of a subject itself conceived as *a priori* in the sense of existing in a mode of simple exteriority to time. Instead, the possibility of the *a priori* of the subject is itself to be conceived more radically in terms of auto-affection as the reflexive (self-)givenness of time *itself* in supplying the formal conditions for any possible making-present. Here, as Heidegger emphasizes, time is no longer understood as Kant does, as a quasi-spatial form of mathematical order, a succession of present-nows, but is rather understood as the very constitutive structure of presenting that makes anything like a present (in a spatial or a temporal sense) possible at all. But to understand time in this way is simply, once more, to understand it from out of the formally indicated structure of Dasein as the being whose meaning is intimately related to that of the present in relation to its own being-in-the-world.¹¹⁰ Thus, in final answer to the question of the relationship of the “I think” and time in Kant,

The difficulty is resolved with one blow once we take seriously time as making-present [Zeit als Gegenwärtigen]. The “I think” is not in time (Kant is completely right to reject that) but is time itself, or more exactly, one mode of time, and indeed that of pure making-present [des reinen

¹⁰⁸ GA 21, p. 338.

¹⁰⁹ GA 21, p. 339.

¹¹⁰ “Gegenwart ist der Sinn vom Sein des Daseins – im Hinblick auf des Seinsstruktur des In-der-Welt-seins, des Seins der Welt.” (GA 21, p. 404).

Gegenwärtigen] As pure making-present, Dasein itself is the “for-which” of whatever it might happen to encounter [Wofür eines möglichen Begegnenden]; and making-present is the letting-be-encountered [Begegnenlassen] itself.¹¹¹

To understand time in this radicalized way as pure auto-affection is to comprehend the possibility of all givenness of form and structuration from out of the primary structure of Dasein and the pure structure of its reflexive relation to itself, the auto-affection in which it gives itself time. But as Heidegger says here, the basic structure of Dasein in its capability of disclosing beings is itself presenting or making-present. Thus, in a determination which will survive long after *Being and Time* itself, Heidegger will understand the unconcealment of entities and the possible intelligibility of being itself as grounded in the basic reflexive structure that gives the form of the present from out of the self-givenness of time.

¹¹¹ GA 21, p. 405 (transl. modified).